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SUMMARY
Although the United States is an Arctic nation, the Arctic has seldom
figured prominently in US policy. In January 2009 the US released its new
Arctic policy. Arctic Region Policy signals that the US is beginning to
understand that the Arctic is changing in a manner that concerns its vital
national interests. The core Arctic issues facing the US are resource
development and international circumpolar relations. The development of
oil and gas reserves in Alaska is discussed in the context of sustainable
development and US domestic energy security, which are often at odds
with each other.  In regards to circumpolar relation, the US has
traditionally been a reluctant Arctic power. It has been unwilling to take
the initiative in the area of international Arctic policy. Now, the United
States also must act to improve its participation in the main Arctic
institutions in order to strengthen cooperation among the Arctic nations.
But at the same time, the US must now face a geo-political environment
that is becoming more complicated and possibly dangerous than was the
case in the last decade. Thus their new policy also emphasizes the
priority the US places on security by maintaining a strong military
presence in the Arctic. All of these actions are already having an impact
on their Arctic neighbors including Canada. This will continue to be the
case as American activity increase in the region. Now that the Arctic is
transforming due to climate change, resource development, globalization,
and geopolitical factors, the United States can no longer ignore the Arctic. 
2INTRODUCTION
By virtue of both its standing as a superpower and its purchase of Alaska in 1867, the United
States is an Arctic nation. But throughout its history, it has seldom recognized this fact. At the
individual level, it has produced outstanding polar explorers such as Robert Peary and Richard
Byrd, as well as modern-day Arctic scientists such as Robert Corell. Furthermore, the Arctic
was central to the United States’ nuclear deterrent posture during the Cold War. The Arctic has
seldom figured prominently in US policy discussions. Thus the United States may be
characterized as the “reluctant” Arctic power.
US Arctic policy may be summarized as reactive, piecemeal, and rigid. While the Arctic is
important to the United States, that fact has seldom reached the attention of US policy-makers
and the US public. This is about to change. The Arctic is changing fundamentally due to
climate change, resource development (in particular, energy), globalization, and geopolitical
factors. Given the developing situation in the Arctic, even if the United States wanted to
continue avoiding Arctic issues, it cannot. Furthermore, the selection of Alaskan governor
Sarah Palin as the Republican vice-presidential nominee reminded Americans of their most
northern state — if only for the duration of the election.
This paper begins with a review of the existing US Arctic policy. To the surprise of many
observers, the Bush administration released a new US Arctic policy on 9 January 2009, in its
last days; 1 the US government had last set out an Arctic policy in 1994. 2 Senior US officials
began the process to develop a new policy in 2007, and observers expected it would be
released before the 2008 election. When this did not occur, many simply assumed that the
crafting of the new policy would be left to the new Obama administration. Thus, its unveiling
in 2009 caught most observers off guard.
Arctic Region Policy is a departure from previous US actions in that it is Arctic specific.
Traditionally, US policy has dwelt with the Arctic and Antarctic simultaneously. This time, the
decision was made to develop an Arctic-only policy. The policy is both frank and direct, and it
has significant ramifications for all Arctic nations — Canada included. While it is not yet clear
if and how the Obama administration will choose to implement the policy, the policy itself
does not signal a significantly different direction for the United States. Instead, it offers a clear
picture of what the United States considers to be its core Arctic policy objectives and provides
a guide on how to achieve them.
The task of developing this policy has been challenged by the reality of a changing Arctic. The
United States has to deal not only with the low priority traditionally given the Arctic, but also
with the fact that the Arctic is changing in ways that are not yet understood. 
Following the introduction of the existing policy framework, this paper examines and assesses
the core Arctic issues facing the United States, focusing on the issues of energy development
and international relations in the region.
1 United States, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD 66;
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 25 — Subject: Arctic Region (Washington, DC: 9 January 2009);
available online at http://media.adn.com/smedia/2009/01/12/15/2008arctic.dir.rel.source.prod_affiliate.7.pdf.
Hereafter referred to as Arctic Region Policy.
2 United States, Department of State, “Fact Sheet: US Arctic Policy,” US Department of State Dispatch (Washington,
DC, 26 December 1994); available online at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1584/is_/ai_16709524.
US ARCTIC POLICY
Although the US government’s Arctic Region Policy provides guidance for American action in
the Arctic, the fact that the document was released only in January 2009 means that there are as
yet no examples of its implementation. Rather, its major utility seems to be in the process of its
creation. Officials close to the system have suggested that the process of policy formation
“reminds” the various core departments that the United States has Arctic interests and that it
needs to think seriously about the Arctic. Nevertheless, the document still provides important
insights into what US policy-makers think is important — when they think about the Arctic at all.
The policy’s preamble states:
The United States is an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling interests in the region.
This directive takes into account several developments, including, among others:
1.  Altered national policies on homeland security and defense;
2.  The effects of climate change and increasing human activity in the Arctic region;
3.  The establishment and ongoing work of the Arctic Council; and
4.  A growing awareness that the Arctic region is both fragile and rich in resources. 3
This focus changes the 1994 policy in two important ways. First, the earlier policy stated that
“[t]he United States has been an Arctic nation,” 4 while the 2009 document states that “[t]he
United States is an Arctic nation” (emphasis added). Second, the new document focuses on
Alaska as at the core of US Arctic interests: as the rest of the document makes clear, Alaska is
a central reason the United States has Arctic interests, but these interests are national in
character, not simply related to the concerns of one state.
These seemingly innocuous changes signify that the United States now understands that the
Arctic is changing in ways that concern its vital national interests. To that end, Arctic Region
Policy lists six objectives, as follows:
It is the policy of the United States to:
1. Meet national security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region;
2. Protect the Arctic environment and conserve its biological resources;
3. Ensure that natural resource management and economic development in the region
are environmentally sustainable;
4. Strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations (the United
States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and
Sweden);
5. Involve the Arctic’s indigenous communities in decisions that affect them; and
6. Enhance scientific monitoring and research into local, regional, and global
environmental issues. 5
3 Arctic Region Policy, p. 2.
4 United States, Department of State, “Fact Sheet,” p. 1.
5 Arctic Region Policy, p. 2.
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These are the same basic objectives as in the 1994 document, but the order has been altered,
with the need to meet national security moved from last to first. 6 Moreover, homeland security
has now been added to national security — clearly a reflection of the changes after 9/11. Thus,
in 1994, US officials were already becoming aware of the changes in the Arctic, and drafted a
policy to respond to them. That policy identified three main themes: a focus on natural
resources and the need to develop them in a sustainable manner; recognition of the fragile
nature of the Arctic environment and the need to better understand it; and recognition of the
international nature of the Arctic. However, although both the 1994 and 2009 policies contain
broad general objectives, nowhere in these documents is there guidance on what the Americans
are supposed to do or how they are to achieve these objectives. The questions thus arise: what
has US policy been on resource development in the North and on the Arctic’s international
dimension, and what should we expect from the Obama administration in the coming years?
And what will be the ramifications of these US policy objectives for Canada, the United States’
most important Arctic neighbour?
US RESOURCE ISSUES IN THE ARCTIC
The heart of US Arctic resource policy and actions is Alaska. The US view of its most northern
state tends to focus on its abundant resources. From its extensive oil and gas reserves, both on
land and offshore, to its fisheries and natural beauty, Alaska is seen as a wilderness to be used.
But how this is to be done is a question Americans have grappled with for a long time.
Alaska’s attraction to outsiders has always been in terms of its natural resources. Prior to the
US purchase of Alaska, the Russians had come to its northern shores in search of fish and
whales. The subsequent discovery of gold in Canada’s neighbouring Klondike region created a
gold rush that still resonates in both the Yukon and Alaska. Other resources also drew outsiders
to the state. The main point is that certain themes developed then that still exist today. The
discovery of substantial amounts of natural resources brought to Alaska a large number of
outsiders who had to deal with the challenge of a formidable climate, a challenge exacerbated
by the considerable distance between Alaska and the continental United States. The United
States then had to pay attention to its relations with Russia, Canada, and the United Kingdom,
which still controlled Canadian foreign and defence policy at the time. When considered in this
light, it should be apparent that the “new” Arctic reflects the old Arctic despite the changes that
are occurring. 
6 The six objectives of the 1994 policy were:
*Protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its biological resources. *Assuring that natural
resource management and economic development in the region are environmentally sustainable.
*Strengthening institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations. *Involving the Arctic’s
indigenous people in decisions that affect them. *Enhancing scientific monitoring and research on
local, regional, and global environmental issues. *Meeting post-Cold War national security and
defense needs. (US Department of State, “Fact Sheet,” p. 1.)
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The largest economic issues facing Alaska pertain to the development of oil and gas reserves
and the means to transport these resources to southern markets. 7 While both the 1994 and
2009 US Arctic policy documents state that any such development should take place in a
sustainable fashion, neither says anything about the tempo of development. This is perhaps
because of the ongoing political debate in Alaska, and in the United States in general, about
how those resources should be exploited. Debate rages over development of the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and the offshore regions of the Chukchi Sea and the
Beaufort Sea, and typically focuses not on how to proceed in a sustainable fashion but on
whether or not drilling should occur at all. 8
The ANWR was made a Federal Protected Area in 1960 and given further protection under the
1980 Alaska National Interests Land Conservation Act, which stipulated that drilling could
occur on these lands only with the approval of the US Congress. While incentives to drill in the
region diminished with the fall in oil prices in the 1980s, the issue took on an international
dimension in 1987 when the United States and Canada signed an agreement regarding the
conservation of the Porcupine caribou herd — whose calving grounds are located in the
ANWR — that requires each party to notify the other if it plans to engage in economic activity
that could affect the herd. In fact, much of the opposition to drilling in the area — especially
on the part of Canada — is based on fears of the negative impact it could have on the herd.
In the offshore areas, Aboriginal, local, and environmental groups have challenged a planned
drilling program by Shell Oil despite the company’s assurances to mitigate environmental
damage.9 Even though Shell had received approval from the necessary federal agencies to
begin drilling, a November 2008 court decision temporarily halted the company’s plans, ruling
that the US government should have undertaken a more thorough environmental study of the
ramifications of the proposed drilling. Exploratory drilling now will not proceed until the court
decision is appealed or a more comprehensive environmental study is completed. 10 From a
political perspective, this might give the Obama administration some breathing space on the
issue of Arctic drilling. 
7 There are also important fisheries issues, particularly surrounding the crab fisheries, but space limitations preclude a
detailed examination of these issues here.
8 See, for example, CBC News, “Shell to Halt Offshore Drilling in Alaska,” 21 July 2007; available online at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/07/21/business/main3084842.shtml?source=RSSattr=Business_3084842. See
also M. Lynne Corn, Bernard A. Gelb, and Pamela Baldwin, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR): New
Directions in the 110th Congress — CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,
8 February 2007).
9 Yereth Rosen, “Shell delays Alaska drilling plan due to legal dispute,” Reuters, 21 June 2008; available online at
http://uk.reuters.com/article/businessIndustry/idUKN2020246220080621.
10 Kim Murphy, “Appeals court rules against Arctic drilling plan,” Los Angeles Times, 21 November 2008, p. A-26;
available online at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/21/nation/na-arctic-drilling21.
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This debate is driven by concerns about the sustainable development of oil and gas in the
Arctic. The issue has developed into an argument between two fundamentally opposed groups.
One side takes the position that opening Arctic lands and waters for oil and gas exploitation is
a means to ensure domestic US energy security — that the development of the resources in the
ANWR will reduce US American dependence on Middle Eastern supplies. 11 The other side is
dominated by those who argue that the contribution of oil and gas in these regions to satisfying
US demand is insufficient to justify the risk to the local environment. 12
Going beyond the concerns of strong vested interests, however, the cornerstone of the debate is
the amount of oil and gas that actually exists in Alaska and its offshore regions. Extensive
exploration of these areas in the 1960s and 1970s led to the discovery of the North Slope fields
that now currently fuel the entire Alaskan production, but no other finds of that magnitude
were made. Then, in the 1980s, the price of oil fell and almost all Arctic exploration ceased.
Interest in exploration renewed at the beginning of 2000, driven by three factors.
First, the continuing conflict in the Middle East, combined with the hostility of states such as
Iran, meant that US dependency on Middle Eastern oil remained part of the core of US foreign
policy debates; the prospect of northern sources of oil offered at least a partial solution to this
dependency. Second, the rising price of oil meant that Alaskan oil and gas was becoming more
economically viable; some analysts suggest, off the record, that Alaskan oil deposits are viable
above about $80 per barrel for offshore deposits and about $55 per barrel for land-based
sources. 13 (These prices were reached and exceeded, but have recently collapsed.) Third, there
is growing evidence that the Arctic region might contain very large unexploited supplies of
both oil and gas. The US Geological Survey, the best-known source of current speculation,
suggests that more than 30% of the world’s undiscovered gas and 13% of undiscovered oil
reserves may be in the Arctic, with by far the largest estimated deposit (some 30 billion
barrels) to be found in the waters immediately off the north coast of Alaska. 14 Of course, only
drilling will determine the accuracy of these estimates. Moreover, it is easy to be confused
about what such figures mean. Recently, Governor Sarah Palin was severely criticized for
allegedly not understanding Alaska’s energy production when she was quoted as saying that the
state accounts for 20% of US domestic energy production — in fact, Alaska’s share is only
about 3.5%, but even if she had actually meant to say oil, rather than energy, Alaska’s total
production in 2007 was only 14% of the US total.
11 See, for example, the website of Arctic Power — the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, at http://www.anwr.org/.
12 See the website of Defenders of Wildlife, at
http://www.defenders.org/programs_and_policy/habitat_conservation/federal_lands/national_wildlife_refuges/threats/
arctic/index.php.
13 The land-based estimate is from United States Geological Survey, Economics of 1998 US Geological Survey’s of
1002 Area Regional Assessment: An Economic Update, Report 2005-1359 (Washington, DC: USGS, 2005); it is
hard to find a published source for the offshore prediction.
14 See Kenneth J. Bird et al., “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal; Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the
Arctic Circle,” US Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2008-3049 (Washington, DC: USGS, 2008); available online at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/.
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In addition to the ANWR, the other areas of great interest for resources are the offshore regions
in the Chukchi Sea and Beaufort Sea. At one time, the Department of the Interior’s periodic
lease sales on blocks of ocean space for exploration and development in these regions attracted
little interest from industry, but this began to change in the early 2000s. 15 The lease sale of
8 February 2008 saw a record-breaking $2.6 billion in winning bids on leases for development
in the Chukchi Sea. 16 Shell Gulf of Mexico Inc. has had the greatest interest in these areas,
but ConocoPhillips has also been active.
Another issue directly related to the development of oil and gas is how they should be
delivered to southern markets. When oil was first discovered on the North Slope in the late
1960s, the United States considered two options regarding delivery. One was to build a
pipeline across Alaska from the north to the southern port of Valdez and then to use
supertankers to carry the oil to the west coast. The other option was to use ice-strengthened
supertankers to carry the oil directly from the North Slope to the east and west coasts of the
United States. Going east, however, would have required a transit of the Northwest Passage.
When the United States tested the viability of this route in 1969 and 1970, it sparked a political
row with Canada, which claims the Northwest Passage as its internal waters and requires all
foreign vessels to request Canadian permission to enter. The United States regards these waters
as an international strait, however, and takes the position that as long as vessels comply with
international standards and rules, no permission is required from Canada. The voyage of the
test vessel, SS Manhattan, created considerable tension between the two countries, and in any
case the ship experienced considerable difficulty transiting the passage during the most
favourable time of the year. Canada dispatched an icebreaker to demonstrate its control of the
passage and to assist the Manhattan — indeed, without such help, the US vessel might not
have completed its voyage at all.
The difficult passage of the Manhattan convinced the oil companies involved that it would be
better to build a pipeline to Valdez and ship oil from there instead. By 1977, the Trans Alaska
Pipeline System (TAPS) — more than 800 miles of 48-inch-diameter pipe — was completed,
at a total cost of $8 billion. 17 The pipeline is owned by a consortium of oil companies —
principally BP, with 47% of the shares, ConocoPhillips, and ExxonMobil — under the name
Alyeska. Four companies — Alaska Tanker Company, Polar Tankers Inc., SeaRiver Maritime
Inc., and SeaBulk Tankers Inc. — deploy 15 supertankers to move the oil from Valdez to
southern US markets. 18
15 See United States, Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Alaska Region, “Leasing Information
— September 16, 2008 (Washington, DC.); available online at
http://www.mms.gov/alaska/lease/hlease/HLEASE.HTM.
16 United States, Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Alaska Region, “Regional Director
Update,” August 11, 2008 (Washington, DC); available online at
http://www.mms.gov/alaska/aboutak/rdmsg/Akrdmsg.htm.
17 Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, “Trans Alaska Pipeline System” (Anchorage, AK: APSC, 2008); available online
at http://www.alyeska-pipe.com/Default.asp.
18 Washington State, Department of Ecology, “Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force Prevention Project,
“TAPS Trade Tankers Present and Future” (Olympia, WA, 3 April 2008); available online at
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/spills/prevention/bap/TAPS%20Trade%20Tanker%20Report.pdf.
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This route, however, is not without its hazards. On 24 March 1989, the single-hulled Exxon
Valdez ran aground and spilled more than 11 million gallons of oil into Prince William
Sound. 19 As a result of that environmental disaster, in 1990 the US Congress passed the Oil
Pollution Act (OPA) and mandated the use of double-hulled tankers by all companies engaged
in the TAPS trade. Under OPA, all new tankers built in the United States must now be double
hulled, and all existing single-hull tankers must be phased out by 2015. The International
Maritime Organization is now attempting to upgrade international standards to match those
under US law. 
The United States was able to act unilaterally with respect to shipbuilding standards as a result
of its protectionist Jones Act, 20 which requires that all goods transported between US states must
be carried by a US-built vessel manned by a US crew, so that only US- owned and -built tankers
can carry oil from Alaska to ports in the continental United States. US protectionism was further
fostered by legislation banning the sale of Alaskan oil to foreign producers from 1974 to 1995,
and 2000 legislation banning direct foreign sales of Alaskan oil. 21 Thus, the effect of such
legislation is US control of the shipping of all Alaskan oil through international waters. 
The United States will soon face a key issue regarding how new oil and gas finds will be moved
to US markets, and a particularly challenging one if and when offshore deposits are found in the
Chukchi Sea or Beaufort Sea. Will these be carried by underwater pipeline or by tanker, or
perhaps some combination of the two? The Russians are currently addressing this issue in their
development of the Stokman Gas field in the Barents Sea. Whatever the United States decides,
important economic, environmental, and international issues will have to be considered.
What should be obvious to most observers is the tremendous activity that is now occurring in
Alaska surrounding the development of oil and gas. Key decisions, however, are not being
made on the basis of a coordinated policy, but in terms of critical political battles. The key
battleground for oil and gas prospects on land is the US Congress, and whether it will decide to
allow drilling to take place in the ANWR. This long-term battle has hinged on possible
environmental damage versus the partial relief these resources provide for US dependency on
foreign sources of energy. The challenge is that there is no definitive understanding of how
much damage could occur (particularly to the Porcupine caribou herd) or of how much oil and
gas exists in these reserves. In many ways, the debate is based on elements of faith and has
more to do with the various political ideologies and beliefs among US business and
environmental groups. In such an atmosphere, it is not surprising that a policy framework
agreeable to all has been impossible to fashion.
19 See United States, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Office of Response and Restoration,
“Response to the Exxon Valdez Spill” (Washington, DC, 14 July 2008); available online at
http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/topic_subtopic_entry.php?RECORD_KEY%28entry_subtopic_topic%29=entry_i
d,subtopic_id,topic_id&entry_id(entry_subtopic_topic)=262&subtopic_id(entry_subtopic_topic)=2&topic_id(entry_s
ubtopic_topic)=1.
20 The legislation is commonly known as the Jones Act after its sponsor, Senator Wesley Jones; its correct name is the
Merchant Marine Act, 1920.
21 See Larry Kumins, West Coast and Alaska Oil Exports, CRS Report for Congress RS22142 (Washington, DC:
United States, Congressional Research Service, 6 May 2005); available online at
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/crs/RS22142_050506.pdf.
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The Impact on Canada
The US focus on resource development in the Arctic has several ramifications for Canada.
From a positive perspective, the potential supply of Canadian Arctic energy supplies to the
North American market is bound to be viewed by the Americans as a positive development.
US Geological Survey studies and the exploration efforts of Exxon and BP make it clear that
substantial amounts of oil and gas can be expected to be found in the Canadian north. Since the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) basically treats all oil and gas as a part of a
common market in energy, any new Canadian supplies would help to address US demand and
reduce US dependency on “foreign” supplies. 
On the other hand, US efforts to develop its Arctic supplies risk placing strains on Canada.
There are two main areas of concern: the development of oil and gas on lands in the ANWR,
and the development of oil and gas resources in the disputed zone of the Beaufort Sea.
As mentioned earlier, Canada is on record as stating that it opposes the development of oil and
gas in the ANWR because of the risk that such action poses to the Porcupine caribou herd.
Should the US government ultimately decide to go ahead with the drilling, Canada will find itself
obligated to publicly oppose the US action. While it is doubtful that Canadian opposition would
have a significant impact on the US decision, it will be seen as an irritant in the relationship.
Far more important are the Beaufort Sea boundary issue and the status of the Northwest
Passage. The United States’ 2009 Arctic Region Policy has sharply narrowed the focus on both
issues. As for the Beaufort Sea, the new US policy, after explaining the US position on this
ongoing dispute, goes on to state the need to “[p]rotect United States interests with respect to
hydrocarbons reservoirs that may overlap boundaries to mitigate adverse environmental and
economic consequences related to their development.” 22 This is something that was not
mentioned in previous policy statements. What this should tell Canadian officials is that the
United States has paid renewed attention to this issue.
A solution could be found, however, if the two states’ political leaders were willing to help
create a joint venture in the disputed zone. Since any oil and gas developed in the region would
be transported to the North American market under the terms of NAFTA, it is not an issue of
either side wanting the resources for itself. It is also important to note that the multinational
corporations developing these resources are already working on both sides of the border. If
Canada and the United States agreed to disagree about the formal border of the region, but also
agreed to the establishment of a joint venture to develop oil and gas in the disputed zone, a
potential political crisis could be averted. Both states have already stated that any development
must be conducted with the strongest environmental protection, so this should not be an issue.
What would remain would be a plan that equitably shares the economic returns of any
development. A joint management plan would give the companies the political stability they
need, and would allay any concerns Canada might have about “losing” either its sovereignty in
the Arctic or its energy security. All sides would emerge winners.
22 Arctic Region Policy, pp. 5, 8.
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US CIRCUMPOLAR RELATIONS
The most significant international issues facing the United States in the Arctic, as identified in
both the 1994 and 2009 Arctic policies, are strengthening institutions for cooperation among
the eight Arctic nations, and meeting post-Cold War national security and defence needs.
What is most striking is that, while US policy states a desire to improve relations with its
circumpolar neighbours, the United States is more likely to take steps that hinder, rather than
foster, Arctic cooperation. Since the end of the Cold War, the Americans have participated in
Arctic multilateral action only with great reluctance. Had they not been continually pressured
by Canada, it is unlikely that they would have joined any of the new multilateral initiatives that
developed at the end of the Cold War. As it stands, the US position is that of a reluctant
participant even when it is clearly in its interest to join. 
There are three main sources of multilateral activity in the Arctic: the Arctic Environmental
Protection Strategy (AEPS), the Arctic Council, and the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). All three involve a hesitant and reluctant United States.
The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and the Arctic Council 
In 1987, toward the end of the Cold War, then-Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev made several
proposals during a speech in Murmansk in 1987 calling for the end of hostilities in the Arctic. 23
Western leaders, including those in the United States, initially ignored this initiative. When it
became apparent that Gorbachev’s reforms were going to revolutionize the USSR, leaders from
the other Arctic nations began to develop plans to create new multilateral Arctic institutions.
The two most important were the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, led by Finland and
supported by Canada, and the Arctic Council, which was a Canadian initiative. The US
response to both was very limited. The Reagan administration was opposed to the creation of
any new multilateral organization and was specifically worried that an Arctic organization
could negatively affect its security interests in the north. It preferred to approach the north on
either a unilateral or a bilateral basis. 
Canadian prime minister Brian Mulroney had proposed the creation of an “Arctic Council” as
early as 1989. Canadian officials pushed for a multilateral body to be created by a new Arctic
treaty that would bind its members to action on a wide range of issues. However, the
Americans’ negative reaction convinced Canadian officials that the time was not right. At this
point, Finnish officials began to push for the creation of a more limited body — a multilateral
body that would tie the Soviets to more cooperative behaviour in the Arctic. They did not
particularly care what the body was to do, only that it needed to exist and then expand. After
consultations with the other Arctic nations, they decided that the body should focus on
international environmental issues. 
23 See Kristian Ååtland, “Mikhail Gorbachev, the Murmansk Initiative, and the Desecuritization of Interstate Relations
in the Arctic,” Cooperation and Conflict 43 (3, 2008): 289-311.
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The Finnish officials argued that addressing a shared problem such as environmental
degradation could act as the means of establishing a dialogue. The Finns sought the assistance
of Canadian officials in developing this dialogue because of Canada’s known ability to operate
in a multilateral forum. Drawing almost directly on a Canadian domestic policy titled the
Arctic Environmental Strategy, the Finns and Canadians developed a draft strategy called the
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). 
Then, in October 1988, the Finns and Canadians launched a series of negotiations with the six
other Arctic states — the Soviet Union, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark (for Greenland),
and a very reluctant United States. In June 1991, in Rovaniemi, Finland, the eight Arctic states
signed a declaration on the protection of the Arctic environment and accepted the
accompanying AEPS. The strategy identified six main tides of pollutants — persistent
inorganic pollutants (POPs), oil pollution, heavy metals, noise, radioactivity, and acidification
— and called for existing mechanisms and agreements to be dedicated to protecting the Arctic
environment and for new initiatives to be considered. Finally, the strategy called for action to
be taken to counter the pollutants. Four working groups addressing different Arctic
environmental issues were created to support these actions.
A ministerial meeting of the AEPS was to take place every two years. The second occurred in
September 1993, in Nuuk, Greenland, at which it was decided to create a fifth working group
— the Task Force on Sustainable Development (TFSD) — and that northern indigenous
peoples needed greater institutional support to allow them to participate in a more meaningful
manner. To that end, the main northern indigenous peoples’ organizations should be invited to
become permanent participants in the AEPS. The United States resisted this suggestion at first,
viewing it as a Canadian strategy to gain additional support for it national position, which it
assumed the indigenous peoples’ groups would closely support on a wide range of issues. The
Americans further argued that since state representatives on the new body already represented
the various aboriginal organizations, giving these groups official standing was to give these
people two votes. They later reluctantly agreed that the northern peoples be granted status as
permanent participants, but insisted that there could never be more permanent participants than
state parties in the organization. This meant that as long as there were eight state parties to the
AEPS, there could never be more than seven permanent participant organizations. The
Americans also insisted that only the state parties be allowed to vote on any budgetary issues.
The first three organizations to accept the ultimately proffered invitation to join the AEPS were
the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) — whose board would also have representation from
US Inuit 24 — the Nordic Saami Council, and the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of
the North (RAIPON).
24 The Inuit are often still referred to as “Eskimos” in the United States, a term not of Inuit origin but that of other
Aboriginal groups to explain the people who lived beyond the tree line to European explorers. The self-identified
term Inuit means “our people.”
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The AEPS proved a successful forum in which the eight arctic nations could bring together
their best experts on issues of international pollutants in the Arctic. The process was an
important learning process for the eight nations and resulted in several reports highlighting
common environmental challenges. It soon became apparent to many of those involved in the
process, however, that an expanded system was necessary, which, in the early 1990s, led
Canadian officials in the Mulroney government to resume efforts to create an Arctic Council
that would have a mandate beyond environmental issues.
Even into the Clinton administration, however, the United States remained aloof to the
Canadian initiative. The Americans attended two international meetings, in May 1992 and May
1993, but only as observers. The May 1993 meeting led to the decision to create an Arctic
Council that would follow many of the practices of the AEPS. Its core membership would be
the eight Arctic states, and permanent participant membership would be given to major
northern indigenous peoples’ organizations. In Canada, in 1994, the new government of Jean
Chrétien continued to support the Mulroney government’s initiative and to prod a reluctant
United States to join. In early 1995, following a series of bilateral discussions with Canada, the
US government dropped its resistance to participate and agreed to support the initiative. 
US participation, however, now meant the need to accommodate US concerns. 25 The Canadian
government originally had hoped that, as an international organization with treaty-mandated
powers, the Arctic Council could address a wide range of issues, including boundary disputes
and trade. A briefing note prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade stated: “Canada is of the strong view that a forum is needed to promote cooperation and
concerted action and to bring political focus to addressing the urgent issues affecting the
circumpolar North. These issues go beyond those related to the protection of the environment”
(italics added). 26 The Americans quickly let it be known, however, that they would support an
Arctic Council only if it focused solely on environmental concerns and could not deal with any
security-related issues. The final agreement, which included a footnote that stated “[t]he Arctic
Council should not deal with matters related to military security,” 27 clearly showed that the
Americans had been successful. The Council was directed to incorporate the work of the AEPS
by assuming control over the working groups, and to build on the work of the Working Group
on Sustainable Development by creating a sustainable development program.
The Americans were opposed to the Council’s developing an independent bureaucracy and
raising revenue sources of its own. As a result, Canada abandoned its efforts to give the
Council a permanent secretariat with its own operating budget. Instead, the Council chair
would rotate on a two-year basis among the eight Arctic states, and the state acting as the chair
would also provide the secretariat costs. Additionally, the working groups would draw only on
the resources that each state would volunteer. 
25 For the best overview of the US position, see Evan Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” American
Journal of International Law 93 (3, 1999): 712-722.
26 Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada’s Proposal to Establish an Arctic Council of
the Eight Arctic Nations,” (Ottawa, 20 April 1995), p. 1.
27 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa, 19 September 1996). The inclusion of a “footnote”
in an international agreement is unique.
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Canada and the United States also disagreed on the meaning of sustainable development within
the Council. The Americans believed that Canadian efforts to establish a second tier within the
Council, to focus on sustainable development, were meant to separate conservation from
sustainability. The Americans took the position that these were the same, and that creating an
artificial division would interfere with the Council’s work. Canada maintained, however, that it
was necessary to be sensitive to the needs of the northern peoples, and that meant not only
conserving the resources but using them in a sustainable manner. The difference between the
two can be traced to the role of traditional hunting and fishing. The Canadian government
strongly supports the right of northern peoples to engage in traditional hunting, and to sell the
results in the southern economy. The US opposition to this view is expressed in its Marine
Mammal Protection Act, which bans the trade in marine mammals. Then-president Bill Clinton
specifically stated that
I have further instructed the Department of State to oppose Canadian efforts to
address trade in marine mammal products within the Arctic Council....[I have
instructed Congress] to withhold consideration of any Canadian requests for
waivers to the existing moratorium on the importation of seals and/or seal
products into the United States. 28
The United Stares also opposes Canada’s giving Inuit hunters permission to kill a small
number of bowhead whales. Following the granting of permission in 1996, the US State
Department threatened to impose sanctions on Canada in accordance with the Pelly
Amendment to the Fishermen’s Protective Act. Though the sanctions were not implemented,
their mere threat demonstrates continuing Canada-US differences on this issue. There is a
certain irony in the US government’s having granted permission to the Inupait of Alaska to
hunt 204 bowhead whales during a four-year period commencing in 1997. 29 The United States
rationalizes its contradictory position by stating that, unlike Canada, the United States is a
member of the International Whaling Commission and, as such, its decision is in harmony with
existing international regimes, while Canada’s decision to allow its northern peoples to hunt
whales is not. The net effect of the US position is that the Council cannot discuss the issue of
selling products gathered by traditional means — in other words, it cannot discuss the US ban
on the sale of these goods. 
In summer 1996, the United States and Canada reached agreement despite these serious
differences, and the Arctic Council was formally created on 19 September 1996 in Ottawa.
Following the practices of the AEPS, the Council was composed of the eight Arctic states and
the three permanent participants; three more have since joined the body — the Aleuts
International Association, the Athabaskan Council, and the Gwich’in Council International. The
Arctic Council has responsibility for the AEPS working groups and meets at the ministerial
level every two years to ensure the progress of its various initiatives. There is no permanent
secretariat; rather, member state volunteer to act as chair for two years, and to assume
responsibility for the coordination of activities and provide the necessary resources to fulfill
these activities.
28 President Bill Clinton, “Letter to the Congress of the United States,” 10 February 1997.
29 See Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada and the
Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation into the Twenty-First Century (Ottawa, 1997), p. 212.
13
14
Canada took the first turn as chair, with the United States following from 1998 to 2000. The
Americans focused on local issues pertaining to the state of Alaska, and brought forward
projects such as tele-medicine and other actions geared towards local communities in the north.
The Council has developed several new initiatives dealing with environmental challenges since
it was established, particularly after the release of a 1997 study on the Arctic environment by
the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, a group within the Council. 30 At its first
ministerial meeting, in Iqaluit in September 1998, the Council initiated an Action Plan to
Eliminate Pollution in the Arctic; another major project, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
(ACIA) has also been completed. 31 One of the great ironies is that while US political leaders
attempted to minimize ACIA’s policy ramifications, Americans actually provided much of the
leadership that led to this report’s success. The multi-year, multi-disciplinary project provided a
clear understanding of the impact of climate change on the Arctic. The exhaustive scientific
report was one of the study’s most important contributions. More important, the public
attention the report received was instrumental in making the Arctic the “canary in the
coalmine” when it came to monitoring climate change. 
The report, and the effort that went into it, reflected an interesting dichotomy about US policy.
On the one hand, an American, Robert Correll, led the entire study, organizing the research and
producing the published papers. American researchers also conducted and led much of the
actual research on which the report was based. There is little doubt that, without the American
input, the report would not have been as thorough and detailed as it was. On the other hand,
US political leaders fought against the report’s policy ramifications. 
Originally, the study was to have been disseminated in three reports: a scientific report based
on peer-reviewed studies of the impact of climate change on the Arctic, a relatively short
executive report summarizing the scientific findings and supported by graphics, and a set of
policy recommendations to rectify the problems discovered by the science. The first two
reports were released to extensive world-wide media attention. US officials ultimately were
successful, however, in watering down the policy recommendations, as they were concerned
that these might run contrary to the Bush administration’s position on climate change — in
particular, its position on carbon emission reductions. While the Americans played a critical
role in the report’s development, they then prevented an international response to the problems
their own scientists played a critical role in uncovering. 
In its 2009 Arctic Policy, the United States reaffirms its position that, while the Arctic Council
plays an important role in the governance of the Arctic region, the United States still opposes
any efforts to strengthen the Council’s powers: “It is the position of the United States that the
Arctic Council should remain a high-level forum devoted to issues within its current mandate
and not be transformed into a formal international organization particularly one with assessed
contributions.” 32 At the same time, however, US policy does acknowledge that it might be
possible to “update” the structure of the Council. What exactly this means needs to be further
developed at future Arctic Council meetings.
30 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Report on the Status of the Arctic Environment (Oslo, Norway:
AMAP, 1997).
31 See Arctic Council, “Arctic Council Action Plan to Eliminate Pollution of the Arctic” (Barrow, AK, 13 October
2000); available online at http://acap.arctic-council.org/admin/media.php?mid=11; idem, Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment, “Mission Statement” (presented at the Fourth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Reykjavik,
24 November 2004); available online at http://www.acia.uaf.edu/pages/mission.html.
32 Arctic Region Policy, p. 4.
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the final major
multilateral action that is reshaping the Arctic. This international treaty, negotiated between
1973 and 1982, codifies existing international maritime law and creates new international law.
The Convention is one of the most sweeping international agreements created to date. The US
history with the Convention, which came into force in 1996, has been interesting.
Successive US administrations, including those of presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter,
supported the treaty’s development because its US negotiators were successful in protecting
core US interests. Just as the Convention was completed in 1981, however, the newly elected
Reagan administration reviewed the treaty and decided that, unlike the previous Carter
administration, it could not accept it because of its opposition to Part XI, which would have
given the developing world a share of the ocean resources of the highs seas beyond national
control. The Reagan administration argued that this section would place an unfair burden on
US industries if deep-sea mining were to occur — that US companies would be made to share
a portion of their profit and technology with the developing world. Given the need for the
United States to accept the treaty, the international community went back to the drawing board
and gutted the offending section of the treaty, which calmed the Reagan administration’s
objections on that issue.
Yet, the United States still has not accepted UNCLOS — there is still a sufficient number of
Republican senators in Congress who view the treaty as an affront to US interests to continue
to assure its passage remains blocked. Recent gains by Democrats might make US accession to
the treaty more likely — certainly, the 2009 Arctic Policy explicitly makes the point that it is in
the United States’ interest to join UNCLOS, specifically calling for the US government to
“(c)ontinue to seek advice and consent of the United States Senate to accede to the 1982 Law
of the Sea Convention.” 33
The Convention affects the Arctic in several ways. The most important is through article 76,
which allows a state to extend control of its seabed and subsoil adjacent to its coasts beyond its
existing 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) if it can show that it has a
continental shelf. It is possible that Canada, Greenland (Denmark), Russia, and the United
States all have the right to do so in the Arctic. Currently, Canada, Russia, and Denmark are
engaged in scientific research to determine if they have a northern extension of their
continental shelf. The United States began to address this question with research of its own in
2001 and in cooperation with Canada in the fall of 2008. 34 The problem the United States has
to contend with is that, by not being party to the Convention, it is unable to submit a claim to
the appropriate UN body (the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf) for
verification. The other Arctic states appear willing to engage the Americans on this issue, as
evidenced by their inclusion in a meeting in Ilulissat, Greenland in May 2008 with the other
Arctic continental shelf claimants. How long the Americans will be included in these
33 Ibid.
34 United States, Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and Environmental and Scientific Affairs, “US Extended
Continental Shelf Project” (Washington, DC); available online at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/continentalshelf/.
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discussions is unknown, but the United States cannot submit its claim to the UN until it
accedes to the Convention. 35 The effect of the Americans as a non-party on any overlap with
Canadian and Russian Arctic continental shelf claims is also unknown. This is one of those
cases where most senior US leaders know they must act but have not figured out how to get
beyond the Senate. It remains to be seen whether this will change under the Obama
administration.
Boundary disputes regarding the continental shelf are not the only such issues the Americans
face in the Arctic. They also have an ongoing maritime boundary issue with Canada over the
Beaufort Sea, and they disagree with both Canada and Russia over the status of the Northwest
Passage and Northern Sea Route. Another issue, which had been thought resolved, may be
arising over the maritime boundary between the Bering Strait and the Beaufort Sea.
The Bering Sea maritime border case between the United States and the USSR/Russia was
supposed to have been resolved in 1990, when the two countries agreed on a boundary.
However, while the US Senate has given its approval, the Russian Duma refuses to do so
because of the impact of the boundary agreement on control of the region’s resources. 36 Some
US senators and Alaska state officials have expressed concern over the status of several islands
on the Russian side of the boundary, although the State Department has publicly stated the
issue is closed. 37
The issue of the so-called donut hole is more problematic for the United States and Russia. As
a result of the geography of the US and Russian coastlines, within their 200-mile EEZs, a
section of the Bering Sea is outside their control — that is, considered to be the high seas.
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Poland all send large trawlers into this area, seriously
depleting the fishing industry in the entire region. 38 Efforts to reach agreement among all these
states have been limited, and there is ongoing fear that the entire eco-system could soon
collapse. It is unclear how to resolve the situation.
35 See Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Conference in Ilulissat, Greenland: Landmark Political Declaration on
the Future of the Arctic,” 28 May 2008; available online at
http://www.um.dk/en/servicemenu/News/ConferenceInIlulissatGreenlandLandmarkPoliticalDeclarationOnTheFuture
OfTheArctic.htm.
36 See Alex Oude Elferink, “Arctic Maritime Delimitation: The Preponderance of Similarities with other Regions,” in
The Law of the Sea in the Polar Oceans: Issues of Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction, edited by Don
Rothwell and Alex Oude Elferink (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), pp. 182-183.
37 United States, Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, “Status of Wrangel and Other Arctic
Islands,” Fact Sheet (Washington, DC, 20 May 2003; available online at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/20922.htm.
38 James Broadus and Raphael Vartanov, Environmental Security: Shared US and Russian Perspectives (Woods Hole,
MA: Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 2002), pp. 60-61.
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The Impact on Canada
The Beaufort Sea dispute centres on how the United States and Canada divide their territorial
seas and the EEZ. Based on differing interpretations of an 1825 treaty between the UK and
Russia, the United States draws the boundary at a 90° angle to the coastline, while Canada
extends the land boundary as its maritime boundary. This difference has created a disputed
zone of 6,250 square miles, resembling a triangle, segments of which both countries have
offered for lease to private companies — Canada did so in the 1970s, and the United States
continues to do so now. Off the record, some officials suggest that the two sides have
unofficially agreed not to accept any bids, but it is not possible to confirm this. The US States
Geological Survey suggests there is a high probability that gas fields exist in the disputed zone,
and a lower probability that oil fields exist. 
This particular dispute could easily escalate. Any suggestion that Canada “surrender” part of its
maritime claim undoubtedly would cause an outcry among Canadians, regardless of the merits
of the case, and any issue that involves the apparent loss of Canadian Arctic sovereignty to the
United States — even technically a boundary dispute — would be difficult for any Canadian
government to handle. A US government that was perceived to compromise US energy security
also would face domestic difficulties. 
The US disagreement with Canada (and Russia) about the Northwest Passage and the Northern
Sea Route is based on its view that both waterways are international straits, meaning that
foreign vessels — including warships — need not ask the coastal state, whether that be Russia
or Canada, for permission to transit. Moreover, the United States takes the position, first
developed in the late 1960s, that all vessels have the right to travel in the mode they normally
use — so that, for example, submarines should be able to remain submerged during transit. 39
To this end the United States has attempted to send vessels through both waterways — in 1967,
for example, it sent two Coast Guard icebreakers, Edisto and East Wind, on a circum-arctic
navigational voyage, but the Soviets refused passage to the US vessels, and threatened to use
force if necessary. The Americans backed down and cancelled the trip, but only after posting a
diplomatic protest. Then there was the voyage of the SS Manhattan in 1969 and 1970, which
was noted above. 
The United States bases its position on the principle of freedom of navigation. 40 Its primary
concern is that any sign of its accepting the Canadian (or Russian) position would encourage
other states, such as Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, to assert greater national control over waters
that are now considered international under law. At the same time, the United States does seem
to place the Northwest Passage in a different category, having agreed — in the 1988 Arctic
Water Cooperation Agreement — to ask Canada’s consent before sending Coast Guard
icebreakers through the Northwest Passage. American willingness to negotiate the agreement
shows their willingness to grant Canada special attention. The impetus for the agreement came
from the close relationship between then-prime minister Brian Mulroney and then-president
Ronald Reagan, who directly ordered the US state department to negotiate the deal. The
agreement continues to work well.
39 See United States, Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Limits in the
Seas no 112: United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims (Washington, DC: Office of Ocean Affairs,
Bureau of Oceans and Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 9 March 1992), pp. 72-74; available online at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58381.pdf.
40 United States, Department of State, “Washington, D.C. 20520, March 12, 1970, INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
FOR MR. KISSINGER — THE WHITE HOUSE, Subject: Imminent Canadian Legislation on the Arctic,” Foreign
Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972 (Washington, DC: Department of
State, Office of the Historian); available online at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e1/53180.htm.
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Concerns over climate change, however, are prompting speculation about the future viability of
international shipping through the Northwest Passage, which could reignite disputes between
Canada and the United States. It is unclear what would happen if a vessel attempted to go
through the passage without asking Canada’s permission. Would the United States keep quiet
and let Canada deal with the crisis, or would it feel compelled to restate its position, and if so,
how forcefully should this be done? Some Canadian commentators suggest that US security
requirements in the post-9/11 world probably would lead them to remain silent. Canadian
Arctic expert Franklyn Griffiths argues that the United States recognizes it is in its security
interests for Canada to retain control over the Northwest Passage. 41 Even some US
commentators — such as former US ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci, and US Council on
Foreign Relations Fellow, Scott Borgerson — have suggested that, if Canada increased its
defence capability in the north, the United States might look the other way in the event of a
challenge to Canada’s claim on the Northwest Passage. 42 The official US position, as stated by
President Bush as recently as 2007, is that the two sides “agree to disagree” and that the United
States continues to view the passage as an international strait. 43 Thus, it is hard to know what
will occur. A very strong Canadian response should be expected if the United States were to
restate its opposition, which undoubtedly would hurt Canada-US Arctic cooperation just when
it increasingly would be needed.
The 2009 Arctic Region Policy has made this issue somewhat more difficult to resolve. At one time
it seemed likely that Canada and the United States could have quietly settled on a joint management
program similar to that overseeing the St. Lawrence Seaway.44 However, the 2009 policy makes it
clear that the protection of “freedom of navigation” remains an American vital interest:
Freedom of the seas is a top national priority. The Northwest Passage is a strait
used for international navigation, and Northern Sea Route includes strait used
for international navigation; the regime of transit passage applies to passage
through those straits. Preserving the rights and duties relating to navigation and
overflight in the Arctic region supports these rights throughout the world,
including through strategic straits. 45
The fact that these waters could be used for the shipment of Alaskan oil and gas in the new
types of ice-strengthened tankers currently under construction by Asian shipbuilders adds
economic pressure on this position. The explicitness of the US position means that it is now
unlikely that Canadian and US officials will be able to find the “wiggle room” necessary to
create the gentlemen’s agreement that many had felt was possible, even given the developing
relationship between Prime Minister Harper and President Obama. The 2009 Arctic Region
Policy does accept the creation of “specific Arctic Waterway regimes,” but makes clear that
these must be developed with “international standards,” not through unilateral action. 46 Thus,
in the US view, Canada can not act unilaterally to develop laws governing maritime passage
through the Northwest Passage. 
41 Franklyn Griffiths, “Beyond Sovereignty: Governing the Northwest Passage as though It Was an International Strait,”
CIC — Foreign Policy for Canada’s Tomorrow (Toronto: Canadian International Council, July 2008); available
online at http://www.igloo.org/canadianinternational/research/publicatio.
42 Randy Boswell, “Simulated talks show possible solution for Arctic dispute,” National Post, 19 February 2008.
43 Associated Press, “Bush seeks to bolster security and economic partnerships with Canada, Mexico,” International
Tribune, 19 August 2007; available online at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/08/20/america/NA-GEN-Canada-
US-Mexico-Summit.php.
44 See Brian Flemming, Canada-US Relations in the Arctic: A Neighbourly Proposal (Calgary: Canadian Defence and
Foreign Affairs Institute, December 2008).
45 Arctic Region Policy, p. 3.
46 Ibid., p. 7.
US ARCTIC SECURITY ISSUES
The 2009 Arctic Region Policy reaffirms the high priority the United States places on security
issues, particularly the importance of maintaining a military presence in the region. Throughout
the 1990s, the United States retained a large number of troops in Alaska, and have enhanced
the Arctic’s strategic importance by locating one of two missile defence interceptor bases at
Fort Greely, Alaska. The US Army maintains three bases (Forts Greely, Wainwright, and
Richardson), and so does the Air Force (Eielson, Elmendorf, and Eareckson). The Coast Guard
has Air Stations at Kodiak and Sitka and maintains safety offices in Anchorage, Juneau, and
Valdez. Official figures are now hard to obtain, but estimated forces total slightly over 25,000. 
The United States has closed some Alaska bases, including a naval base on Adak that had more
than 6,000 personnel at the end of the Cold War. 47 Fort Greely was to have been closed by
2001, but the order was rescinded when it was decided to site a missile defence system at the
base. The United States also maintains three fighter wings of F-15s (approximately 22 aircraft
per wing) for air sovereignty flights. During the 1990s, these aircraft simply practiced flying to
maintain their proficiency, but the patrols gained renewed importance following 9/11. Then in
August 2007, the Russians announced the resumption of their long-range Arctic patrols. The
US F-15s are now called upon to intercept any Russian aircraft that are deemed to come “too
close” to US airspace. So far, no Russian aircraft has actually entered US (or Canadian)
northern airspace, but F-15s have made several interceptions of Russian TU-95 Bear long-
range bombers in the past year. 48
The number of subsurface voyages the Americans made throughout the 1990s is unknown. A
core task of the US submarine force during the Cold War was to track and prepare to engage
Soviet submarines under the Arctic ice. With the end of the Cold War and the near collapse of
the Soviet/Russian submarine force, the United States assumed that the importance of this task
had greatly diminished. Indeed, the composition of its current submarine force reflects the US
perception that the Arctic is not of high strategic importance, although the US Navy is known
still to deploy a submarine in Arctic waters at least once a year. 49
47 Elmendorf Air Force Base, “Military History in Alaska 1867-2000,” factsheet; available online at
http://www.elmendorf.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=5304.
48 See Russian News and Information Service, “Russian strategic bombers fly routine patrols over the Arctic,”
6 September 2007; available online at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080609/109606915.html.
49 The Seawolf class submarine, which was supposed to replace the Los Angeles class, is reported to have excellent
under-ice capabilities — one, the USS Connecticut, has been seen at the North Pole. The class was deemed too
expensive for the new security environment when the Cold War ended, however, and only three were built. The Los
Angeles class is now being replaced by the Virginia class, which some sources have suggested does not have good
under-ice capabilities. It is certainly the case that all US submarines reported in the Arctic are either Los Angeles or
Seawolf class boats.
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The United States has also reduced its icebreaking capabilities, having added just one new
vessel to its existing small fleet since the early 1980s. As of 2008, there were only three
icebreakers, one of which, Polar Star, may be withdrawn from service due to mechanical
problems. The need for new icebreaker construction is a controversial issue among US policy
makers. 50 In an era of intense debates concerning the building of new navy vessels, US Coast
Guard requirements tend to be completely overlooked. The diverse roles icebreakers play only
make it more difficult to determine whose budget should pay for new ships. The Coast Guard
currently finances its icebreakers by arrangement with the National Science Foundation, but
this relationship is being re-examined. Some senior US military leaders, becoming aware of the
increasing accessibility of the Arctic, are calling for a recapitalization of the icebreaking fleet. 51
The current Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Thad Allen, has repeatedly called for
the construction of new icebreakers: “All I know is, there is water where it didn’t used to be,
and I’m responsible for dealing with that.... Given the 8 or 10 years it would take to build even
one icebreaker, ...I think we’re at a crisis point on making a decision.” 52 The decision, if and
when it comes, will be one of the most expensive the Americans will make pertaining to the
Arctic. If the United States intends to maintain icebreaking capability when the demand for it
increases, however, it will need to make a decision soon. At the same time, pressure is
mounting to add icebreakers to the increasing US military presence in the Arctic as more
international actors begin to arrive in the region.
The Impact on Canada
As the United States build its military capabilities in the Arctic, Canada faces a number of
interesting challenges. First, it needs to reassess several of its cooperative military
arrangements with the United States. The 2009 US Arctic Region Policy stresses national
security as that country’s first priority in the region, but it is interesting to note that, although
the document specifically names several international bodies, it fails to mention the one
bilateral agreement that is instrumental to US Arctic aerospace security: NORAD. While its
mandate has been expanded to include all aerospace regions, NORAD has always focused on
the north. In the face of renewed Russian northern bomber patrols, it is clear that there will
continue to be a need to bilateral cooperation. From a Canadian perspective, it is interesting to
observe that, although the Arctic Region Policy does not hesitate to list the disputes that exist
between Canada and the United Nations, it makes no mention of this clear indication of
successful cooperation.
50 See Ronald O’Rourke, Coast Guard Icebreaker Modernization: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress,
CRS Report for Congress RL 34391(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 11 September 2008);
available online at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf.
51 See National Research Council, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Roles and
Future Needs, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment in a Changing World (Washington, DC:
National Academics Press, 2007).
52 Quoted in Andrew Revkin, “A push to increase icebreakers in the Arctic,” New York Times (18 August 2008);
available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/17/world/europe/17arctic.html.
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Another challenge Canada faces is the Arctic Region Policy’s explicit regard of the Northwest
Passage as an international strait in its assertion that “(p)reserving the rights and duties relating
to navigation and overflight in the Arctic region supports our ability to exercise these rights
throughout the world, including through strategic straits.” 53 If this US view ultimately
prevailed, anyone, including the Russians, would have the right to fly their military aircraft
over the waters of the Northwest Passage — clearly, such a right would not be in the security
interests of either Canada or the United States. 
If the Americans are serious about increasing their surface fleet presence and increasing the
number of icebreakers, they will have continue to cooperate with Canadian security forces. Given
the region’s lack of infrastructure, any extended deployment would have to be a cooperative
venture in any case. The Canadian Navy and Coast Guard have excellent operational relations
with their US counterparts, which should aid future efforts at cooperation in the region.
Facilitating this interaction would be an increase in Canadian capability, which is slowly under
way with the construction of Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessels and at least one new icebreaker.
The US Coast Guard is already assisting Canada to map its northern continental shelf.
One area that remains a question mark for Canada-US security relations is that of missile
defence. The United States has already placed one of two operational land-based anti-missile
sites very near the Alaska-Yukon boarder. Canada, through a decision of the Paul Martin
government, chose not to participate in the US program, which raises the question of what this
decision will mean as the Americans continue to develop their system. 
Finally, the transit of US submarines through the Northwest Passage remains an issue for
Canada. If the passage were deemed an international strait, all countries would have the right
to sail their nuclear-powered submarines submerged through these waters without notifying
Canada. Canada argues that it “allows” US submarines to do this in the name of common
security, under the terms of either NORAD or NATO, but whenever a US submarine is forced
to show itself in these waters, the Canadian government risks facing substantial criticism from
the media and the general public and an irritation of Canada-US relations. 
Thus, in general, increased US and Canadian military presence in the north probably will lead
to a further strengthening of operational relations between the two counties. But the US
insistence that the Northwest Passage is an international strait could have significant security
costs for both states in the region.
53 Arctic Region Policy. p. 3.
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THE COMING CHALLENGES FOR US ARCTIC POLICY
Where does this leave the United States? US action in the Arctic has significant core themes,
within which numerous issues need to be addressed. 
The first theme is that US Arctic policy has two main thrusts: energy and security. The oil and
gas in and around Alaska are seen as the primary means of increasing the domestic percentage
of US oil and gas supplies. Significant obstacles remain, however, before these resources can
be developed. Although the indicators are promising, the location and quantity of these
resources will remain unknown until exploratory drilling occurs. Several companies are now
willing to begin the search, but have hit up against the second core obstacle: political and
public opposition. There is no clear consensus within the United States on the desirability of
bringing these resources on line. There are strong opinions on both sides of the issue. While
many Americans see the expected new supply as a means of providing both energy security
and economic benefits, many others are afraid that any such development could cause major
damage to the northern environment. As a result political, legal, and public debates continue on
this issue, and it is by no means clear how the United States will proceed.
The second theme is the unilateral focus that the United States places on its interactions with its
Arctic neighbours. With the end of the Cold War, the Arctic region diminished in importance as
the core strategic theatre in the event of war. While several Arctic nations viewed this as an
opportunity to improve international cooperation in the region, the US response has been that of a
very reluctant participant. The Americans have shown no interest in playing a leadership role in
developing new cooperative instruments in the region. Instead, they have preferred to deal with
issues on a bilateral basis or to simply ignore the issues facing the Arctic. 
The United States will need to reconnect with the Arctic, however, given the developing
situation. The triple forces of climate change, resource development, and geopolitical changes
are now combining to make the Arctic a much more active region in the world. To a large
degree, the Americans have been able to focus on local issues in Alaska and ignore the larger
international issues because few international players could make it to the Arctic. There was
little international activity even throughout the 1990s. So, for what does the United States now
need to prepare?
Despite the US government’s refusal to agree to a set of solutions or responses, US scientists
have been instrumental in showing that climate change is fundamentally changing the Arctic.
The ice is melting and entire eco-systems are being transformed. This will have a direct impact
on several economic interests, including oil and gas development, fishing, tourism, and
shipping, to name only a few. Developing these resources will further facilitate change in the
Arctic by drawing more international players to the region. In turn, Arctic nations will then
increasingly have to improve their own ability to act in the Arctic, which will then serve to
increase interaction between the Arctic states and the international actors. All of these factors
feed into each other to accelerate the processes at play.
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Climate change will transform how oil and gas resources are developed and transferred to
market. Climate change is decreasing the amount of ice, but not eliminating it. Any offshore
developments will need to deal with the impact of more open water (for example, in the form
of more severe storms or higher waves). They will also need to address increasing variability in
ice conditions. As the ice melts, producing larger areas of open water, it will be increasingly
difficult to determine the position of the remaining ice. Offshore platforms will need to be built
to handle more intensive wave action and increasingly mobile ice flows. Moreover, any effort
to develop onshore sources of oil and gas will have to deal with an increasingly fragile land
surface as the permafrost begins to melt. This is already causing problems with existing
infrastructure. Any new systems — especially pipelines — will have to deal with the
challenges that climate change brings.
This will also complicate the task of getting the product to market. New solutions are being
developed outside North America: the Russians, Finns, and South Koreans are all now engaged
in the design and construction of systems that can operate in an increasingly volatile Arctic
Ocean. Samsung Heavy Industry in South Korea is building specially designed oil tankers that
can operate in both ice-covered and ice-free waters. The Russians are in the process of designing
and building new ice and open water platforms that can be anchored in Arctic waters. They
reportedly have spent upwards of $44 billion on a system to exploit one of the world’s largest
gas fields (Stokman) in the Barents Sea, which is expected to come into production by the end
of the decade. Obviously, US industry has the ability to replicate all of this technology, but the
Russians and Asian countries already have a substantial lead in many areas. 
Although this paper has not examined issues surrounding the Alaskan fisheries, climate change
is already beginning to shift traditional habitats. No one really has a good understanding of
what this ultimately will do to the existing bio-systems. Some species may flourish, but in all
probability others will suffer. This means that the existing fishing industry will need to adjust.
In some instances, this adjustment may require ceasing operations or at least downsizing. In
fact, the Americans will probably do so north of the Bering Strait. A report by the US North
Pacific Fishery Management Council recommends a moratorium on fishing as new stock move
into the region, arguing that, given the lack of understanding about new stocks moving into
the warming water, establishing a new fishery should be postponed until further research is
undertaken. 54
As the ice melts, tourism is paying increasing attention to the north. Southern Alaskan waters
are already experiencing an increase in cruise ship traffic. This will soon create a host of new
challenges and opportunities. While increasing tourism will provide new jobs and economic
opportunities in the regions visited by these ships, concern is growing that their owners are
beginning to push the boundaries of operating in a safe manner. While the ice is retreating, it
can still sink ships. The cruise vessel Explorer, which was sunk due to damage caused by an
ice pack in Antarctica, was a seasoned Arctic vessel; less experienced vessels are clearly at
greater risk. 55 The Americans will be increasingly hard pressed to monitor their activity and to
respond to accidents.
54 Randy Boswell, “Arctic fishing ban places pressures on Canada,” Canada.com (15 February 2009); available online
at http://www.canada.com/Arctic+fishing+report+places+pressure+Canada/1292718/story.html.
55 Colin Woodard, “Questions swirl around the sinking of the MV Explorer,” Christian Science Monitor
(3 December 2007); available online at http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1203/p04s01-wogi.html.
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The final economic issue the United States must address concerns the prospect of international
shipping as the ice recedes. The current debate is whether such traffic will go through the
Northwest Passage, the Northern Sea Route, or over the North Pole itself. The answer to this
debate depends on the manner in which the ice melts, the time frame during which this occurs,
and the new types of ship that are being designed and built. But any shipping that attempts to
use the Arctic as a shorter route will have to pass through the Bering Strait. Thus, the United
States will be at the front door of the new shipping route no matter what Arctic route is used.
This position poses numerous challenges for the Americans. Given their treatment of the issue
of the TAPS tankers, they fully understand the need for ship construction and safety standards
that exceed existing international standards. At the same time, they will have to coordinate this
understanding with their position regarding international straits in the Arctic. Currently, only
US ships transport Alaskan oil through a set of convoluted policies that are throwbacks to the
protectionist era of the 1920s. Consequently, the Americans can ensure that those US ships
adhere to their strict regulations concerning environmental and safety standards. These policies
cannot ensure, however, that the international ships that will come through the Bering Strait
have been built and are operated to the best environmental standards. 
The Americans will also need to deal with the geopolitical reality that they share the strait with
Russia. As Sarah Palin has repeatedly stated, the strait is so narrow that, from Alaska, you can
see Russia on a clear day. It should also be noted that an active environmentalist movement in
the United States will act to ensure that the environment in and around the Bering Sea and
Strait is protected, even if the US government wants to ignore the issue.
Ultimately, US policy makers need to address the changing geopolitical environment in the
Arctic. The race by the Arctic states to determine their respective Arctic continental shelves is
leading to some observers to be concerned that this is the start of an Arctic resources rush. 56
The United States’ Arctic neighbours are all beginning to rebuild their military and coast guard
abilities in order to operate in the north, and to take more assertive — even aggressive — tones in
the Arctic. 57 As a result, the United States will need to pay much closer attention to the region.
56 Scott Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown,” Foreign Affairs 87 (March/April 2008).
57 For Canada’s actions, see Rob Huebert, “Canada and the Changing Arctic: At the Crossworld of Cooperation and
Conflict” (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2008); available online at
http://www.irpp.org/indexe.htm. See also Russian News and Information Service, “Russia must protect its Arctic
interests — Security Council” (1 October 2008); available online at
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081001/117375528.html; BarentsObserver.com, “Russia is not a threat to Norway”
(19 September 2008); available online at http://www.barentsobserver.com/russia-is-not-a-threat-to-norway.4511417-
16149.html; and BarentsObserver.com, “Is Norway putting relations with Russia in jeopardy?” (18 August 2008);
available online at http://www.barentsobserver.com/is-norway-putting-relations-with-russia-in-jeopardy.4501964-
28235.html.
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THE DIRECTION AHEAD
The Americans can no longer ignore Arctic issues. They have to deal with the main issues of
resource development and relations with their Arctic neighbours in a much more
comprehensive fashion than ever before. The costs of business as usual are too high. The Arctic
is changing, and if the United States is to meet this challenge and gain the benefits, it must
think ahead and it must think creatively. So what does it need to do?
1) The United States needs to develop its Arctic policy in a multi-dimensional, multi-
disciplinary fashion. Everything is connected in the Arctic. The United States cannot think
of security as separate from the environment, and that these are separate from the economy.
This can be difficult for any government to keep in mind, but it is absolutely necessary that
the Americans understand the interconnectedness of issues in the Arctic.
2) US leaders need to recognize that the age of the Arctic is dawning. There is no doubt that
other issues, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, or the economy will continue to dominate the
United States’ attention, but it cannot continue to ignore the north. 
3) The key issues the United States will face are resource development and international
relations. The coming political battles over the issue of energy development will dominate
US Arctic discourse for the next decade. The Americans must decide how this will be done,
and this will require the participation of all interested parties in a dialogue about what this
means. Oil and gas companies will have to engage in a frank and open discussion with the
environment and northern aboriginal organizations. If the decision is made not to develop the
northern energy sources, then let the US government close further discussion on the matter
so that these companies can avoid wasting their resources in the north. On the other hand, if
development is to occur, it must be done so in accordance with the highest environmental
standards. This will entail considerable expense, and all parties involved in the process will
have to be completely open about what is required and how it will be paid for.
4) Northerners should be consulted in any policies the US government adopts for the north.
They must not be harmed by, but must benefit by the decisions that are reached. The Arctic
is home to many Americans, some whose ancestors have lived there since time
immemorial. Any US policy must always have a human face.
5) The United States must abandon its unilateral (perhaps even isolationist) tendency when
dealing with its neighbours. It must accede to the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea. It was never in the American interest to sit on the sidelines; it definitely makes no
sense in terms of the Arctic. The United States must also treat the Arctic Council more
seriously. The United States benefits from this body’s work and needs to think in
multilateral policy terms. Until the end of the Cold War, US leaders recognized that US
national interests were protected and promoted by adherence to multilateralism. After
efforts to “go it alone,” US leaders again realize the value of multilateralism. The
developing challenges in the Arctic are multi-dimensional and do not stop at the borders of
each Arctic state. They require solutions that are not unilateral.
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6) The United States also needs to recognize the special relationship it shares with Canada in
the north. The United States’ core interests are very similar to Canada’s — the protection of
the north from all manner of threat, environmental to traditional, and the development of
the north’s resources through the best environmental practices in a manner that directly
benefits all North American northerners. 
These issues must be addressed now, as the Arctic is undergoing massive transformation. The
US government knows what it needs to do in the Arctic. Is it prepared to act?
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